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Ample empirical evidence demonstrates the persistence of deviations from
purchasing power parity (PPP henceforth).1 The last decade of floating
exchange rates has confronted us with a remarkable contrast between the
behavior of goods prices and that of the exchange rate.2 The exchange rate
between the U. S. and its major trade partners tends to behave according to a
random walk, whereas changes in goods prices demonstrate considerable
autocorrelation. These observations,taken together, describe an economy in
which variations in the nominal exchange rate tend to represent short- and
intermediate— run changes in the real exchange rate. Attempts to explain
exchange rate movements have had limited and questionable success.3 Only in
countries with systematic large discrepancies in monetary expansion rates does
one find a tight relationship between exchange rate movements and the
differential between the rates of money supply growth.
Debate continues, however, on the economic interpretation of these
observations. Do they demonstrate that the PPP doctrine is irrelevant? Do
deviations from PPP follow a random walk?4 Almost any attempt to model
international transmission must use some version of the law of one price, and
the above empirical regularities raise question about the gap between such
regularities and current modeling strategies.
The purpose of' this paper is to demonstrate that the above observations
regarding the real exchange rate are compatible with a long-run version of
PPP, in which intermediate—run deviations from PPP are explained by a market
structure of monopolistic competition with staggered and unsynchronized price
setting. We take the case for which each pricing decision involves real
cost. Those costs reflect, for example, expensive collection and processing
of information and lead producers to reduce the frequency of their pricing-2-
decisions. Each decision will therefore involve the pre—setting of the path
of prices for several periods. A producer is facing potential competition
both from foreign traded goods and other domestic producers. We start by
evaluating the optimal pricing strategy for each producer.NJext, we turn to
the derivations of the rational expectation equilibrium resulting from such a
pricing strategy. This allows us to derive the path of both domestic prices
and relative prices (i.e., the average price of domestic goods relative to
imported goods) and various covariances between exchange rate changes and
goods price changes. The discussion focuses on the relevance of the EPP
doctrine and the nature of the short- and intermediate-run deviations from
relative PPP. The doctrine of relative PPP postulates that in a world of
stable relative prices, exchange rate depreciation should match inflation rate
differentials.5 The paper demonstrates that, in a market characterized by
monopolistic competition and costly pricing decisions, we obtain systematic
deviations from relative PPP in the intermediate run, although in the long run
prices adjust according to the relative PPP doctrine. The effective duration
of the "intermediate run" is shown to depend on the degree of substitutability
of domestic and foreign goods, and the volatility of the exchange rate. Both
of these factors affect the degree of price staggering. A larger degree of
substitutability between domestic and foreign goods would reduce the pre-
setting horizon, and consequently also the degree of price staggering. As a
result, we would approach a flexible pricing equilibrium, where exact relative
PPP would hold all the time. A smaller degree of demestic-foreign goods
substitutability would work in the opposite direction, generating systematic
deviations from PPP.It is important to note, however, that quite apart from
the degree of goods substitutability, relative PPP is the underlying long-run
pricing rule.—3—
Section 2 of the paper describes the model. It starts with a formulation
of the producer problem in a flexible price equilibrium. This equilibrium is
used as a benchmark for the equilibrium obtained in the presence of costs of
pricing decisions. The section ends by determining the rational expectation
equilibrium for the case of a stable covarianee structure where pricing
decisions are made in an unsynchronized manner. Section 3 studies the
stochastic properties of prices and deviations from PPP. Section 4 provides
concluding remarks. The Appendix derives the optimal pricing formula and the
pre—setting horizon._24 —
2.The Model
Let there beZ domestic producers, organized in a monopolistic-
competitive manner.6 All of them face the same demand curve and share the
same technology. Demand facing producer k is given by
EPa
(1) Dk[ n ] j1 k k
j k
where E is the exchange rate, P is the price of' importables, and P. is
the price charged by producer j .Thedemand facing producer k reflects
two sources of potential competition: all the other domestic producers (as
reflected in the first term); and foreign goods, priced domestically as
*
EP (as reflected in the second term). An alternative presentation of the
demand facing producer k is:
*
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being the own price-demand elasticity. We assume 6 > 1 .Production
technology is given by
(2) (Lk)1
where Lk corresponds to the labor input used by producer k .Letus




We assume that the labor input costs P .Tosimplify presentation, we
neglect both the potential role of traded input in the production process, and
the possibility that labor is paid according to a CPI index, reflecting the
share of traded goods. The country is taken to be small enough to face a
*
givenforeign price, assumed to be unity (P 1)The only source of
uncertainty is the exchange rate. We neglect the potential role of other
sources of uncertainty (for example, productivity and domestic demand
shocks). The above assumptions can be relaxed without affecting the logic of
the subsequent discussion.
Consider a hypothetical flexible equilibrium, under which a producer k
sets its price at the level that would maximize its profits. Let us
denote the flexible equilibrium price by k This equilibrium will be used
as a benchmark for subsequent discussion. Producer k is assumed to take its
competitorst prices as given. To simplify notation, lower-case letters denote
the logarithmic value of the corresponding upper-case variable (i.e., xlog
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Severalobservations are in order. First, and 6 are linked
together by an additive property:
(5) +(—1)b 1
Thus, in a flexible price equilibrium k diverges from 0 by a weighted
average that corresponds to the exchange rate (weighted by ) and to domestic
producer prices (each weighted by 6) .Thisadditive property corresponds to
the homogeneity postulate: an equa-proportion rise in all competitors' prices
raises at the same rate. Jotice also as
we find that 1
,6-oand o. corresponds to demand
elasticity with respect to prices of the foreign goods. At the limit of
perfect substitutability we find an exact version of PPP: i.e., a given
change in the domestic price of foreign goods will trigger an equal change in
the price of domestic goods (in a flexible-price equilibrium).
If all domestic prices are flexible, our assumptions regarding domestic
producers imply that all producers will charge the same price, p .From(4)




We proceed by assuming the presence of gains from pre—setting the price
path for several periods. Those gains represent savings in the costs of
frequent collection and processing of new information. A related discussion,
though in a different context, can be found in Mussa (1981); Rotenberg (1982)
and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977). The main difference between the present—7—
paper and their approach is that they consider the role of the cost of
changing posted prices, whereas the present analysis focuses on the role of
fixed costs related to each pricing decision. As a result, their analysis
resulted in a policy of pre—setting a price for the relevant pricing horizon,
whereas the present paper sets a price path for the pricing cycle. This
difference is relevant for the rational expectation solution in a staggered
pricing equilibrium. In this respect, this paper is related to Fischer
(1977), who studies wage contract determinations in the presence of two—period
——-i _4- .'-__I-, euLIl.[deL•iueHew Ui 1L1C ULUULUII i ill d.LiUwiIi,
for endogenous determination of the extent of staggering prices, focusing on
the role of the degree of substitutability between various goods and the
stochastic structure in explaining the nature of the resultant equilibrium.7
Suppose that, due to the presence of gains from pre-setting the price
path, producers make a pricing decision each n periods. (The economic
determination of n is studied in the Appendix.) At the beginning of each
pricing cycle, a producer will set the price path for the next n periods.
h . . Letus denote by d the price in period d that was pre-set d-h periods
ago. For example, a producer who starts a pricing cycle in period t should
decide the path of (p ,p1
•..p11
). TheAppendix shows tha the
optimal pricing rule is:
(7) pz Et t÷j o￿j ￿ n - 1
where Et is the expectation operator, conditional on the information
available in period t .Equation7 corresponds to a rule that pre—sets
prices at the expected flexible equilibrium path.
We assume a stable stochastic structure, and unsynchronized price
setting. Thus, at period t we can find n types of domestic producers,-8-
differentiated only by the timing of their last price pre-setting decision.
Assuming a large number of identical domestic producers, we have in each class
of producers Q/n rn agents.
Consider a producer that pre—sets prices today for the next n periods.
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degree of staggering (n) ."a"rises and "b" drops
substitutability between domestic and foreign goods
We proceed by imposing the following structure:
follows a random walk process with a trend:
and "b" drop with the









z 8+ae ÷ b rn
Such a producer is faced with m producers that pre-set prices j
periods ago (hence their present price is p) ,ljn—1 ,andrn—i producers
of his type. Thus, (8) can be rewritten as:
n—i
0 J
(9) Pt8 ÷ a e ÷ b •Pt
Ji
Notice that a +(n-i)b z1 .Forlarge9. we find from definitions that
)—9—
To simplify, the exchange rate path is taken to be exogenously given.8
Each producer is assumed to know all present prices, and the structure of the
economy. From equation (7) it follows that if a producer pre-set prices for
period tjperiods ago, he did so at the expected flexible equilibrium
level. But the flexible equilibrium price at t is p ,thus:
j 0 (11) PtEt. Pt
Invoking the assumption of rational expectations, we can solve the system
defined by (9)—(ll) recursively. By applying the expectation operator
Et(fli) to (9) we find, (using (11)) that:





to (9), using (12'), we obtain:
8 n-2 o n-2
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Following this process recursively, we find that:
(14) +E(fll)e÷ i-kb Etk (ojn-2)
The resultant pre—setting rule is now specified by (12') and (14).
Several observations are in order. A relative PEP pricing rule implies
equality between domestic price changes and the expected changes in the
exchange rate. This holds precisely for the pre-setting of prices n-i
periods ahead, (12'), where the price is set such as to equate the expected
relative price (p-e) at the "non-stochastic" equilibrium, —9.This
implies that is allowed to adjust fully to expected depreciation. Note
that as the substitutabilty between domestic and foreign goods rises
( ) ,
OOa o ,generatingabsolute PPP. For a pre-setting horizon
shorter than n-i ,weobtain a pricing rule under which deviations from
relative PPP reflect the interaction between the market structure and
inovations in the exchange rate. For example, producers who pre-set the price
for tn-2 periods ago( p2) did it according to (13'). The expected
relative PPP pricing rule would set p2 at +Et_fl_2)et
.Thus,actual
n-2 . . a
Pt deviates from a relative PPP rule by Et(02)[l_1b (n-2)' .Note
that as we approach a perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign
goods a1 and bo (because a -).Insuch a case,
i-b (n—2)
approaches zero, and one gets an exact PPP pricing rule. This result holds
for all horizons, becauseikb
÷1for a +(forkin) .Ingeneral, a
smaller substitutability with foreign goods and a shorter pre-setting horizon-11-
(i.e.,smaller j in equation 114) will magnify deviations from the expected
PPP pricing rule.
Next, we turn to the derivation of the price level in our economy, which




where refers to the price level. Mote that applying (15) to (9) we
find that:
(16) a e÷ b (n





From (17) we find that relative prices, or in our case deviations from
the law of one price, are:
0 n-2 - o a l+j (18)
Pt
— ÷ (1—n 1- jb Et_j Jo
Or, alternatively:
0 n-2
(19) - (::+ jatj
3.The Stochastic Properties of Deviations from PPP
The previous section has derived the reduced form for average prices and
deviations from PPP. From (17) we see that a current exchange rate
shock () would affect present average prices by .Itwould also affect
future average prices, jperiods ahead, by1-j.b
(oj￿n-2) .Thus,
its net effect on prices would increase over time, at an accelerated rate.-12.-
After n periods, it would achieve its full effect on the price level. The
opposite path applies for the effect of an exchange rate shock (s) on
relative prices (e - .Itwould at once affect relative prices by
(1— ).Itsimpact would diminish over time at an accelerated rate. From
*n-2a (19) we find that it will take
1÷a+b
periods to eliminate half of the









of' the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods
(smaller )magnifiesthe effect of a given exchange rate shock on relative
price by "prolonging" its effective influence on deviations from PPP.
1e can now apply (l7)-(18) to obtain a solution for the covariation of
exchange rates and prices. It can be shown that
-- 2 a 2
(21) coy pt_i; e_ e1)
+
(22) coy (et_ -(ei_ );e- e1) (1-)a2
The covariation of prices and exchange rate depends on the sum of two
components: the first reflects the trend, the second the volatility of the
exchange rate weighted by the elasticity of the contemporaneous price with
respect to the exchange rate, —.Thus,for inflationary countries the
first term will tend to dominate .Forsuch countries, will be tightly
related to monetary expansion, and we would expect monetary growth to be
tightly correlated with changes in the exchange rate and prices. For
countries with low and similar inflationary trends, the first term in equation
21 will tend to be of lesser importance, and the covariation will depend on—13—
For a low degree of substitutability of domestic and foreign goods, and
a longer pricing cycle (a larger n) ,willtend to be small,implying a
small covariation of prices and exchange rates.
The Appendix derives the optimal pre-setting horizon, n (equal also to
the extent of contract staggering), which is shown to decrease with a2 2
A larger degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods (dcz>o
which implies da>o) ,aswell as a more volatile exchange rate will reduce
the pre.-setting horizon. Thus, we can state the ratio of as a function of
the degree of domestic—foreign goods substitutability (ct) .Asa dwindles,
so does (both da<o and dn>o) ,implyingthat relative prices (e -
willbehave as a moving average of a higher order. For a large n we might
find that relative prices could be approximated by a low—order, autoregressive
process, corresponding to the findings reported in Frenkel (198la).
The elasticity of average prices with respect to the exchange rate plays
a key role in the covariation of the exchange rate and relative prices.In
the presence of a longer pricing cycle, we find a tighter covariation. As
a—o
,mostof the short-run variations in relative prices can be explained
by variations in the exchange rate.
As gets smaller, the observer will tend to reject the PPP
hypothesis. Even for "intermediate" values of —,inan economy
continuously subject to variations in the exchange rate, PPP would be
frequently (almost always) violated. But as our pricing rule (14)
demonstrates, this observation is fully consistent with a long—run view of
PPp.-14-
14Concluding Remarks
The present paper has demonstrated that observable deviations from PEP
can be explained by the presence of optimally staggered prices in a
monopolistic competitive economy. In such an economy, PEP holds as a long
—run proposition.
Among the limitations of the paper are the assumption of exogenously
given path for the exchange rate, and the lack of a dynamic analysis of the
path that brought the economy into a symmetric staggered pricing
equilibrium. Thfirst limitation can be resolved by adding the money-market
equilibrium condition to the discussion. For example, if we assumed an
exogenously given path for the money supply, we can solve endogenously for the
exchange rate path.10 Resolution of the second limitation seems
challenging. Suppose, for example, that we observe in the present period an
unexpected change in the stochastic structure. We can expect such a change to
trigger a resetting of the price path by some producers. The tendency to
reset the price path should be stronger for those producers that had pre-set
prices most recently. Such an attempt would tend to destroy the initial non-
synchronized equilibrium. An interesting task would be to derive the
equilibrium path that corresponds to such an adjustment.—15—
Appendix
The purpose of this Appendix is to study the optimal price-setting
rule. This is done in two stages. First, assuming a given pre-setting
horizon (given n) we find the optimal pre-setting rule. Next, we evaluate
the determinats of optimal n .
a.The optimal pre—setting rule
We found in the text that in a flexible equilibrium the optimal price is
given by (a).Thissolution was arrived at by solving the following
problem:
(Al) Max r(pk)
where r' (P<) =PkDk(Pk)
—PLk





(A2)corresponds to the second-order Taylor expansion of profits around
j.r(<) are profits at the optimum, and --
2 2
a
evaluated at .Supposenow that producer k wishes to pre—set t÷k in
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where V (X4<) is the variance of Xt÷k ,conditionalon information
available at period t .Becausethe path of is independent from
t÷k
profits will be maximized by:
k
(AS) t÷k Ett+k
b. The optimal pre-.setting horizon (n)
We derive optimal n in several steps. First, we derive the expected
loss from pre-setting in period t .Next,for a given n we measure
the cost of pre-setting prices per cycle as the net present value of expected
losses during the cycle. Finally, we specify the costs of' pricing decisions
to obtain the n.p.v. of profits in our economy. Optimal n is the result of
minimizing this last expression.
Applying (A3)—(A5) we obtain that expected profits in period t+k
resulting from charging p<k ,are:
k - - - 2
(A6) EtF Et F t÷k —F2Et(ptk_Etptk)
Therefore, the expected loss from pre—setting the price for period t+k-17-
is:
(A7) r2Ett+k Et t+k
This result is measured in terms of nominal profits in period t+k .We
obtain a real measure by deflating r2 byt÷k the price leve. For
large numbers of producers, assuming that we are close to the flexible
equilibrium, we can approximate
r i_i r' I (l---)[ 2 2 y y(S—i)
Wedenote by Ht+k the loss in real terms:
(A9) Ht+h r Et t÷h -Ett÷h
LIotice that ÷h and+h t÷h Using these facts, we











If a typical producer pre—sets the price path for n periods, the
expected net present value of the loss from pre-setting (in terms of the
beginning of the cycle) is:
n—i
(A12) (n) H / (i+r)h for n?2
h1t÷h
(1) 0
where r denotes the real interest rate, assumed to be exogenously
given. Applying (All) we find that-18-





h1 ko (1—kb) (i÷r)
andc(1)O.
To derive a measure of expected profits, we should include in our
consideration the role of the cost of pricing decisions. Suppose that each
pricing decision involves cost c .Tosimplify derivation, suppose that in
period zero we start a new pricing cycle. The net present value of profits,
resulting from following a policy of pre-setting the price path every n
periods, is:
(Al4) D - {(n)+c}
1
h n hzO (1+r)
where bisthe net present value in a flexible—price equilibrium (i.e.,
where for all t ,andco) .Weuse as a benchmark. To
obtain net profits, we adjust D by the n.p.v. of costs resulting from pre-
setting the price path (n.p.v. of c(n))and the n.p.v. of the cost of
pricing decisions (n.p.v. of c). A strategy of n1 will minimize the n.p.v.
of (to zero), at a cost of maximizing the n.p.v. of c. Alternatively,
setting the price path for the entire future (n )wouldmaximize the
n.p.v. of 2 (n) ,minimizingthe n.p.v. of c.In general, we will balance
the two costs at the margin, and n is found by maximizingDn Following
some tedious calculations we find that
(A15) <0 >0
A rise In a implies that for a given pre-setting horizon, the costs
of pre-setting have increased ao
)>0);motivating a cut in the pre-
setting horizon. If we take the limit of perfect substitutability between
domestic and foreign goods (c cr),wefind that (n) for-19—
n>1 (because .Therefore,in this limiting case optimality calls
for n1 ,whichis the case where P ,andPPPholdsat all times. 12
Thus, a necessary condition for generating deviations from PPP is a limited
degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.—20—
Footnotes
1. See, for example, Frenkel (l981a), Kr-avis, Heston and Lipsey (1982).
2.For a summary of empirical regularities, see Frenkel (l981b) and Mussa
(1979).
3.For a test of the explanatory power of various approaches, see Meese and
Rogoff (1983).
Z4•Empirical evidence (Frenkel (l981b)) has shown that deviations from PPP
follow an AR(1) process, with an autocorrelation of .9, close enough to
unity such that one cannot reject the random walk possibility.
5.For a discussion on relative and absolute PPP, see Frenkel (1976).
6.Monopolistic competitive equilibrium in an open economy was studied by
Flood and Hodrick (1983). They focused on the role of inventory
adjustment in explaining the business cycle. Dornbusch (1976) revived
the interest in pre—set pricing models of floating exchange rates.
7.Our approach is closer to Fischer (1977) than to Taylor (1979), who
considers a staggered equilibrium that sets one price for the pre-setting
horizon, which is taken to be exogenously given.
8.The random walk choice is motivated by the empirical regularities
observed in the last decade. In principle, the path of the exchange rate
can be endogenously determined if one adds the money market equilibrium.
8
9.Motice that _2 —,equalto the relative price obtained in a
a a
flexible equilibrium ( -e
,see(6)).
10.In such an economy, the exchange rate might follow a random walk if the
money supply is generated by the random walk process (see Mussa (1976)).
11. The problem of an optimal pre-setting horizon is related to the question—21—
of optimal labor contract length, as addressed by Gray (1978). The new
aspect of the present discussion is the focus on the role of' market
structure (degree of goods substitutability) and the presence of
endogenous staggered prices.
12. Alternatively, as +owe find that a o .Insuch a case 0 ÷o ,
andn ÷ .Thisresult reflects our assumption that the only
uncertainty sources are shocks to the exchange rate. In a more general
analysis, which allows for the presence of productivity and domestic
demand shocks, as c +owe would find that n would approach its closed
economy optimal value, whereas as
-* n 1-22-
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